GRE閱讀備考，考生最缺乏的不是各類(lèi)練習(xí)資料，而是對(duì)于原版專(zhuān)業(yè)讀物的閱讀量積累。下面是小編為大家整理收集的關(guān)于GRE經(jīng)濟(jì)類(lèi)閱讀：揭秘契約理論獲諾獎(jiǎng)背后真相的相關(guān)內(nèi)容，希望對(duì)大家有所幫助。
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)可能看起來(lái)是一門(mén)了無(wú)生氣的科學(xué)。
In its simplest models, prices elegantly balance supply and demand, magically directing individuals' pursuit of their own self-interest towards the GREater good.
在其最簡(jiǎn)單的模型中，價(jià)格微秒地平衡了供求，把個(gè)人對(duì)于自身利益的追求魔術(shù)般地引向更大的好處。
In the real world, humans often undermine the greater good by grabbing whatever goodies their position allows them.
在現(xiàn)實(shí)世界中，人類(lèi)經(jīng)常是通過(guò)攫取地位許給他們的甜頭來(lái)突出更大的好處。
The best economic theorizing grapples with this reality, and brings us closer to understanding the role of power relationships in human interactions.
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)最好的理論化行為研究這種現(xiàn)實(shí)，并讓我們更接近于理解權(quán)力關(guān)系在人類(lèi)交往中的角色。
This year's Nobel Prize for economic sciences—awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom—celebrates their study of economic power, and the tricky business of harnessing it to useful economic ends.
獎(jiǎng)給奧利弗·哈特和本格特·霍爾姆斯特羅姆的今年的諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)表彰的是他們關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)力的研究以及把將其運(yùn)用于有用的經(jīng)濟(jì)目的的棘手之事。
Behind the dull-sounding “contract theory” for which the two were recognized lies an important truth: that when people want to work together, individual self-interest must be kept under control.
在兩人因之而得到承認(rèn)的聽(tīng)上去無(wú)趣的 “契約理論” 背后存在著一個(gè)重要的真相：當(dāng)人們想要一塊工作時(shí)，個(gè)人的自身利益必須處于被控制之下。
For a chef and a restaurant-owner to work together productively, for example, the owner must promise not to use the power he has to change the locks in order to deny the chef his share of future profit.
例如，對(duì)于想要一起高效工作的廚師和餐館所有者來(lái)說(shuō)，所有者必須承諾不會(huì)為了否認(rèn)廚師的未來(lái)利潤(rùn)份額而使用他手中的權(quán)力換鎖。
Mr Hart, a British economist working at Harvard University, tackled power dynamics while seeking to explain the existence of firms—a question which has troubled economists since the work of the late Ronald Coase, another Nobelist, starting in the 1930s.
在哈佛大學(xué)工作的英國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家哈特，在處理了權(quán)力動(dòng)力學(xué)的同時(shí)還試圖解釋企業(yè)的存在，這一問(wèn)題，已故的另一位諾獎(jiǎng)得主羅納德·科斯于上世紀(jì)30年代開(kāi)始研究，一直困擾著經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們。
Firms provide some advantage over dealing with others through exchanges of cash for services in the open market, but economists have struggled to pinpoint what that advantage is.
企業(yè)在開(kāi)放市場(chǎng)用金錢(qián)交換服務(wù)與其他人做生意時(shí)提供了某種優(yōu)勢(shì)，而經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們?cè)噲D指出那個(gè)優(yōu)勢(shì)是什么。
The difficulty in writing contracts that cover all future situations seems to be crucial.
訂立囊括未來(lái)情況的契約的困難似乎很關(guān)鍵。
Agreeing beforehand how any hypothetical future windfall or loss ought to be shared can be impossible.
事先就任何假設(shè)中的未來(lái)盈利或損失應(yīng)當(dāng)如何分享達(dá)成一致應(yīng)該是不可能的。
Yet the uncertainty of working without such a complete contract could be big enough to prevent potentially profitable partnerships from forming.
然而，沒(méi)有了一份如此全面的契約，工作的不確定性可能大得足以阻止?jié)撛谟锇殛P(guān)系的形成。
In work with Sanford Grossman, (an economist who might plausibly have shared the prize), Mr. Hart reasoned that firms solve this problem by clever use of the bargaining power bestowed by the ownership and control of key assets, such as machines or intellectual property.
在與桑福德·格羅斯曼 (一位本應(yīng)合理地分享今年諾獎(jiǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家) 的合作中，哈特?cái)喽�，企業(yè)是通過(guò)對(duì)所有權(quán)以及機(jī)器和知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)等關(guān)鍵資產(chǎn)的控制權(quán)所賜予的議價(jià)權(quán)的靈活運(yùn)用來(lái)解決這一問(wèn)題的。
Instead of fussing over how to divide up the spoils in every possible future, in other words, workers agree to sell their labor to a firm that owns the machinery or technology they use, in the knowledge that ownership gives the firm the power to hoover up a disproportionate share of the profits.
換言之，在知道所有權(quán)賦予企業(yè)得到不成比例的利潤(rùn)份額的權(quán)力的前提下，工人會(huì)同意將其勞動(dòng)出售給擁有他們所使用的機(jī)器或技術(shù)的企業(yè)，而不是為了如何在每一種可能的未來(lái)中分配戰(zhàn)利品而瞎操心。
This power comes with costs as well as benefits, which help shape how big companies become and exactly what they do.
這種權(quán)力除了帶來(lái)利潤(rùn)之外，還帶來(lái)有助于形成公司規(guī)模和具體業(yè)務(wù)的成本。
In other work, Mr. Hart noted that workers and managers who look after equipment can make decisions to improve its productivity (like maintaining the machinery and investing in training).
在另外的研究中，哈特指出，維護(hù)設(shè)備的工人和管理人員能夠做出提高生產(chǎn)效率的決定 (如維護(hù)設(shè)備和投資于再培訓(xùn))。
But just how much time and energy they spend on such efforts depends on what share of future profits they can expect.
但是，他們會(huì)把多少精力用于此類(lèi)努力則取決于他們所能期盼的未來(lái)利潤(rùn)份額。